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THE STREAM OF PROGRESS IN THE LAW*
BERNARD L. SHIENTAGt
"LECTURES are not much to my taste," said Charles Lamb in a
letter to Mrs. Wordsworth explaining why he had not heard
either Coleridge who was lecturing on Shakespeare or Hazlitt on Poetry.
"If read," Lamb said, "they are dismal and flat and you can't think
why you are brought together to hear a man read his work which you
could read so much better at leisure yourself; if delivered ex tempore,
I am always in pain lest the gift of utterance should suddenly fail the
orator in the middle. If I have to select one of these rather unhappy
alternatives I should in all candor have to take the first although an
audience gathered not by inclination but by necessity might well prefer
the second." I too have chosen the first method but not, I hope, with the
same dismal prospect for my audience that Lamb apprehended.
The Hughes Lecture is delivered annually in this Association, pri-
marily to honor one whose memory will ever be enshrined in our hearts
as a fine gentleman, a leader of the American Bar, a distinguished states-
man and a great jurist who successfully guided the destinies of the
Supreme Court of our land, of which he was the head, during one of
the most critical periods in its history. With an intellect of steely
quality there was combined in him an uncompromising passion for truth.
Once he became sensible that a moral issue was involved, from that
moment, right or wrong became the supreme test for him. Charles
Evans Hughes needs no praise from us here. Rather do we honor our-
selves as we gather in this hall once in every year to draw inspiration
and encouragement from the example of one who stood close to the top
of the tree of judicial statemanship in our country. It is from his life
and from his works that we derive a higher point of view, a firmer grasp,
an elevation above the petty interests of life.
I need hardly remind this audience that I come here not as a legal
philosopher, professional or otherwise. I deal with my subject as one
who has been a worker in the vineyard of the law for over forty years
* The Hughes Memorial Lecture, delivered at the New York County Lawyers Aso-
ciation, October 31, 1951 (as revised).
t Associate Justice of the Appellate Division, Supreme Court of the State of New York,
First Department.
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of which over twenty-five years have been spent on the Bench in trial
and in appellate work.
I have heard it observed that if our laws were deemed to register
our progress there could be little disposition to boast; rather their study
tends to create in the lover of democracy a humble and contrite spirit.
Looking at the state of our law today, I venture to approach the con-
sideration of my subject, certainly so far as our substantive civil law
is concerned (and for the most part this lecture will have to be confined
to that), in a spirit that is humble, to be sure, but by no means contrite.
While we have not made the splendid and revolutionary advances of the
natural sciences (sometimes with their accompanying destructive possi-
bilities) we may view what has been accomplished in the law, not indeed
with complacency, but with a certain degree of satisfaction and even
of pride. That there are faults and abuses cannot and should not be
denied, but on the whole there is much more to be thankful for than to
condemn.
While our progress in the law has been slow and characterized gener-
ally by a gradualism, disappointing unless viewed in the cumulative
retrospect, it has been for the most part a steady, substantial, progressive
improvement. Indeed, it might well be said of the law: "This here
progress; it keeps on." True, the current of the law did not always flow
with equal speed. There were times when it "dawdled in backwaters";
at other times it rushed, with unrestrained impulse, "down the rapids
of events."
Occasionally, although not too often, it is a good thing to look back
over the road by which we have traveled and to survey the past and view
it as a vital living force in the present. I come here not, in the main,
as an apologist for our law, nor to boast of its achievements, but rather
to take a somewhat objective view of its progress, with all its strength
and its weaknesses. It is my creed that in the law, as in politics and the
other social sciences, while ideals may not be fully realized, it is the
pursuit of them that makes for improvement.
Without any attempt at formal philosophical discussion, let me say
that, by temperament, by experience and by whatever power of reason
the Divine Creator of the Universe endowed me, I am a firm believer
in a natural, moral law, absolute with respect to certan fundamentals
and variable in its applications in accordance with changes in mores,
in social and economic environments and in the moral conventions of
different epochs. There are, as Dr. Osler has pointed out to his own
profession, certain great ideas which flow fresh through the ages and
control us as effectively as they did our forebears thousands of years ago.
In the law as in medicine we have to hold fast to basic principles. There
[Vol. 21
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are occasions, of course, when adaptations are necessary, if old values,
which we should retain, are to be preserved in a new environment. To
me the ideal of natural justice is one of the most powerful and appealing
concepts that has, through the centuries, motivated juristic thought.1
The object of the law is to do as much good as possible and its ultimate
justification is to be found in moral considerations. That law and moral-
ity cannot be identical is obvious. There are divine commands, there
are moral precepts, which do not permit, in the very nature of things,
of enforcement by any lay tribunal. Thus, "Honor thy Father and thy
Mother," thou "shalt not hate thy neighbor in thy heart" are divine
injunctions and ethical precepts of the highest order. Unaccompanied
by any overt act, however, sanction for their compliance must be found
in the conscience of man-in what Maeterlinck calls "the heroic, cloud-
tipped, indefatigable energy of conscience." It should, however, occasion
no surprise to find how much positive law, in the form of judicial deci-
sion or legislative enactment, has been built around those two high eth-
ical commands. Law, for the most part, is concerned with external be-
havior, rather than with subjective states of mind unless they are accom-
panied by or constitute part of overt acts. More and more, however,
the law is inquiring into the subjective quality of an act in order to
determine its legal consequences. I do not of course speak of that kind
of crime or offense coming under the classification of inlunt prohibitunt
where intent is immaterial in many instances. Public policy may require
that, in the prohibition or punishment of particular acts, it may be pro-
vided that he who shall do them shall do so at his peril and will not be
heard to plead as a defense good faith or ignorance.
Law and morals do not coincide but the close relationship between
the two is striking and the gap between them is ever narrowing. The
sense of justice and equity is constantly introducing life and flexibility
into the law and adjusting it to the fulfillment of its appointed task.2
No wonder that ancient thinkers, like Aristotle for example, included
the discusson of the elements of law in their treatment of ethics and for
Socrates and Plato the analysis of right was inseparable from the idea
of justice. Nor is it mere chance that in all European languages except
the English the terms for law and right coincide.'
The values inherent in the law may be said to be moral content, cer-
tainty and expediency, varying in the order of their importance in dif-
1. See Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. 343 (1820) (per Chancellor Kent);
Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co. et al., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (190);
Evans v. Evans, 1 Hagg. Consist. 35 (1790) (per Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell)).
2. See Moanis RAPHAEL CoHE--z, LAw AwD = SocmL ORDER 261 (1933).
3. See V-oGRoADoFr, Como.N SENsE nz LAw 23 (1914).
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ferent branches of the law. Certainty and predictability have their
urgent claims in branches of the law such as, for example, real property
and commercial transactions. There are large areas in the law where
it is necessary to establish rules, often ethically indifferent, to carry on
the ordinary daily and business life of the community, so that people
may know beforehand what they may do and may not do. Those who
have acted in reliance on such rules are entitled to have their expecta-
tions fulfilled.4 But even in those branches of the law, certainty can
often be had only at a price entirely out 6f line with its real worth. It is
in the carefully studied and safeguarded transition in emphasis from
the expediency, or even from the certainty of a rule of law, to its moral
or ethical content that progress is made. Morals, it has truly been said,
are potential law. As one of England's most distinguished jurists has
put it: "Great judges have said that the function of the common law
was the perpetual quest for justice. I should be sorry if quest for certi-
tude were substituted for quest for justice.",N
Before taking up a few specific branches of the law to illustrate their
progressive development along lines of natural justice, it would be well
to recall certain great basic principles which emerged during the early
growth of the common law. It has been rightly observed that it is a
spiritual tragedy not to see the way the ideals we cherish came, and to
lose the memory of their past.
The Basic Struggles of the Common Law
All through the early growth of the common law we find struggles
centering around a number of fundamental propositions. These, with
their implications, singly and in combination, determined the path of
Anglo-American law and gave it many of its unique characteristics.
Following fundamental principles of natural justice, they gave recogni-
tion to those protections under the law, of life, liberty and property
which today constitute our basic freedoms.
The first of these propositions was the overriding desire for security.
From this desire came the transition from self help and private ven-
geance, by way of the ordeal and trial by battle, to the King's Peace-
the recognition that crimes were the concern of the state and wrongs
against the state. After a good deal of hesitation and uncertainty in
the 13th Century, this led to the establishment of the right to trial by
jury6 and later the denial of the power of the courts to punish jurors
4. Cf. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358 (1932), deal-
ing with the so-called prospective change in judicial decision. See also Patterson, Cardozo's
Philosophy of Law, 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 71, 158 (1939).
5. Lord Wright, in 66 L. Q. REv. 454, 456 (1950).
6. RADCF AND CROSS, THF ENGLISH LEcAL SYsTEm 62-3 (1946).
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for improper verdicts.7 There followed the savage criminal code empha-
sizing property at the expense of human life, the establishment of a
police force to prevent, detect and assist in the prosecution of crime;
and the ultimate humanization of the penal law.
The second basic struggle centered around the abhorrence of arbitrary
action from whatever source. This found its expression in the develop-
ment of the writ of habeas corpus, the most powerful writ known to the
law, the most effective weapon ever contrived by the wit or ingenuity
of man to guard the freedom of the individual against unlawful restraint
-a writ, the preservation of which is safeguarded by the fundamental
law of our nation and state." Lord Justice Denning in an interesting
lecture on "Freedom Under the Law," tells us that "whenever one of
the King's Justices takes his seat, there is one application which by long
tradition has priority over others. Counsel has but to say 'My Lord,
I have an application which concerns the liberty of the subject' and
forthwith the Judge will put all matters aside and hear it. It may be
an application for a writ of habeas corpus or an application for bail,
but whatever form it takes it is heard first."D
We then encounter Magna Carta, originally a compact exacted from
King John at Runnymede in 1215 by the barons of England-the most
significant single document in the history of English Law. What matters
is that its most famous clauses have lost the rather narrow, technical
meaning and application they had for the men who wrote them. Some
of the clauses have reverberated through the centuries and aroused in
the hearts of men a love of freedom and of justice that glowed and en-
larged until it formed the very cornerstone of the democratic way of
life. There is the Fortieth Clause: "To none will we sell, to none will
we deny or delay right and justice." The most famous clause of all,
the Thirty-ninth Clause, provides that "No freeman shall be taken or
imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed,
nor will we go upon him nor will we send upon him except by the lawful
judgment of his peers or the law of the land." The happy phrasing, the
7. Bushell's Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 999 (1670).
8. See Morhous v. N. Y. Supreme Court, 293 N. Y. 131, 56 N. E. 2d 79 (1944); Hogan
v. N. Y. Supreme Court, 295 N. Y. 92, 65 N. E. 2d 181 (1946), in which the Court of
Appeals upheld prohibition restraining the Supreme Court from hearing and determining
habeas corpus proceedings on the ground that corar nobis was the exclusive remedy; see
also Anderson, Prohibition vs. Habeas Corpus, 17 BRooELvN L. REv. 47 (19S0). I agree
wholeheartedly with the observation of Desmond, J., in his dissenting opinion concurred
in by Loughran and Conway, J.J., in People ex rel. Wachowicz v. Martin, 293 N. Y. 361,
369, 57 N. E. 2d 53, 57 (1944), that "if 'the great writ of habeas corpus has been for
centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom' then a restric-
tion of its scope is a matter fraught with dangers most grave."
9. LoRD JusnicE DnmiNGo, FREE0Dm UNDER THrE LAW 2 (1950).
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great generalities of this clause had a content and a significance that
varied from age to age. It was the precursor of the due process of law
clauses in our federal and in our state constitutions. This was the clause
which was mistakenly, but successfully used to support the right to trial
by jury, a right still protected even in civil cases by our federal consti-
tution and our state constitution, a right which in England in civil cases
is now discretionary with the court. We turn the pages of history and
come to the establishment of the doctrine of the supremacy of the law,
a right inherent in the English Common Law, for that law sprang from
the people and not from the will of the reigning Monarch-a doctrine
implicit in Magna Carta-a doctrine completely vindicated by Lord
Coke who courageously and successfully, on the memorable morning of
November 10, 1607, took issue with the reigning King on that crucial
proposition. We then have the act creating security of tenure for the
judges, thereby insuring the independence of the judiciary-a neces-
sary corollary to the supremacy of the law in a democratic form of
government.
The third great struggle dealt with freedom of speech and of the press,
"the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of
freedom." We encounter the unsuccessful attempt to limit the scope of
the jury's verdict in prosecutions for seditious libel, leading to the enact-
ment of Fox's Libel Act in England in 1792. In New York the struggle
culminated in the great Libel Act of 1805 which, with its successors,
by way of constitutional mandate and statutory enactments, established
for all time the freedom of the press, in this state.
And finally the fourth basic proposition revolved around the struggle
of the common law for survival-the unique pattern of case law which
distinguished the common law from the civil law, over which the former,
with its rather rigid system of writs, successfully prevailed. There fol-
lowed the steady growth of the law by precedent after precedent, supple-
mented in the course of time by statute law, the doctrine of stare decisis,
still controlling in England in all its ancient rigor,'" but relaxed, to some
extent at least, particularly in the fields of constitutional and public law,
in this country." The craving for justice, unsatisfied by many of the
10. See Birch Brother Ltd. v. Brown, [19311 A. C. 605. "I would only add that, while
the rule 'stare decisis' is binding on your Lordships, the decisions of this House in pro-
gressively construing a statute must often be stepping stones rather than halting places."
Id. at 631 (per Lord Macmillan).
11. "The great generalities of the constitution have a content and a significance that
vary from age to age. The method of free decision sees through the transitory particulars
and reaches what is permanent behind them." CARnozo, TuE NATUE or TF. JUDiciAL
PROCESS 17 (1921). "In private law the process of judging is a never-ending movement
and something more is exacted from them that play their part in it than the lifeleis repe-
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harsh and rigid rules of the common law, led to appeals to the conscience
of the King, the establishment of the Court of Chancery with its juris-
diction in Equity and later to the consolidation of the common law and
equity courts into one high court of original jurisdiction in this state
in 1848 and in England in 1873-1875.
Restitution ad Unjust Enrichment
One of the greatest advances in the common law along the lines of
natural justice received its impetus from Lord Mansfield when he adapt-
ed the writ of indebitatus assumpsit to permit actions at law to recover
for unjust enrichment. In 1760, in the celebrated case of Moses v.
Macferlan, ' he implied a contract for the return of monies resulting
in unjust enrichment. He resorted to the fiction of a contract in order
to bring the case within the framework of the writ. However his deci-
sions in that field rested primarily on considerations of natural justice
and equity. "If the defendant be under an obligation, from the ties of
natural justice, to refund, the law implies a debt, and gives this action
[indebitatus assumpsit] founded in the equity of the plaintiff's case as
it were upon a contract ('quasi ex conttractu', as the Roman Law ex-
presses it.)"' 3 "It is a liberal action, founded upon large principles of
equity, where the defendant cannot conscientiously hold the money."' 4
The extension of this doctrine at law, and in equity by way of subro-
gation, equitable lien and constructive trust, has done much to bring
the law into harmony with moral and ethical ideals. In England, the
theory of fictitious contract still seems to prevail, although sharply
criticized there.' 5 In this country the minds of lawyers have turned
away from the theory of fictitious contract. Instead, problems of unjust
enrichment are dealt with on the basis of natural justice and aequurn
et bonurn.
The Restatement of the American Law Institute calls it the Law of
Restitution and sums it up as follows: "A person who has been unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to
tition of a mechanical routine.Y Cmwozo, TE GROWH or TnE LAW^ 105 (1924). See also
Mr. justice Douglas, Stare Decis, 4 REcoRDs or =E AssOc 0crAn or Tna BAR or T=n CiTy
or NEW YORK 152 (1949) (Cardozo Lecture).
12. 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (1760).
13. Id. at 1009, 97 Eng. Rep. at 678.
14. Sadler v. Evans, 4 Burr. 1985, 1987, 98 Eng. Rep. 34, 35 (1766).
15. Sinclair v. Brougham et al., [1914] A. C. 398; see WRxonT, LEM,,. ES-AYS Avm
ADDRESSEs 1 et seq., 15, 20, 33 (1939); WYnFIEW, PRovn;c or Tim LAW or TonT 131
(1931); AL , LAW flx THE UMA G 229 (1930); see however Holdsworth, Unjustifiable
Enrichment, 55 L. Q. REv. 37 (1939); 12 Hor.LDswoR=, Hiso or E:.NGLIsHx LI, 54S
(1938); JAcxsoN, TE HtsToRy or QuAsi CoNTRACT N ENGmIsn LAw 119-21 (1936).
1952]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
that other." The boundaries of this great moral principle of justice, of
this equitable doctrine of restitution for unjust enrichment, are con-
stantly being expanded; its flexibility is one of its virtues and in its
application narrow considerations of privity are for the most part
ignored. We are still confronted however, in this field, with problems
of recovery for unsolicited benefits and for the unsolicited discharge of
obligations; but while there is the hostility of the law to intermeddlers,
the emphasis is on the obligation of a defendant to restore what in
equity and good conscience he should not be permitted to retain.10
Lord Mansfield's actual decision in Moses v. Macferlan has been
criticized because he failed to distinguish between money paid under
mistake of fact and payment made by mistake of law.17 However as the
result of the recommendations of the New York Law Revision Com-
mission, provision was made in 1942 for relief against mistake of law,
another milestone in the progress of the law along ethical lines.18
Equity
The development of equity is one of the most fascinating chapters in
the history of the law. It may be said to have originated in the plea
to the King for justice in individual cases. The multiplicity of these
appeals, addressed to the conscience of the King, caused their reference
to the King's Council, of which the Lord Chancellor, in the early days
a learned ecclesiastic, was the head. This led to the establishment of
the Chancellor's Court, or as it later became, the Court of Chancery.
Designed as a corrective of the common law with its rigid, inflexible
writs and many of its harsh rules, it started to administer justice along
individualized lines or, as it has been characterized, according to "the
length of the Chancellor's foot."
In the course of time, equity became systematized and by successive
precedents grew and expanded in scope. Not only did the jurisdiction
of equity develop but it influenced changes for the better in the law
administered in the common law courts. As Maitland put it: "Equity
came not to destroy the law, but to fulfill it."
The rivalry between the two systems, operating side by side, led to
frequent clashes which came to a head in the famous controversy be-
tween Lord Chief Justice Coke and Lord Chancellor Ellesmere in which
16. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHaIENT 136 et seq. (1951).
17. See 12 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENoGSH LAW 545 (1938); but see KEENER, LAW
Or QuAsi CONTRACT 412-16 (1893).
18. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 112-f. For the scope of this amendment see REPORT OF T11E
NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COnMaSSION, N. Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, 27-67 (1942),
and Note, 11 FoRD. L. REV. 327 (1942).
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the Lord Chancellor, the embodiment of the conscience of the King,
prevailed. 19
To this day, equity, despite its more or less systematized principles,
is the great reservoir of natural justice and morality in the law, acting
not indeed arbitrarily or capriciously but in accordance with the dictates
of reason guided by what is just and right.-0 To this day "the plastic
remedies of the chancery are moulded to the needs of justice" 21 and it
is the constant concern of equity to temper the wind to the shorn lamb.
It devised one of the greatest instruments of natural justice-the con-
structive trust, "the formula through which the conscience of equity finds
expression."" So we find equity developing the far-reaching system of
trusts, the duties and obligations of fiduciaries, of injunctions restraining
and mandatory, of specific performance, of reformation and rescission
for fraud or mutual mistake, all in accordance with principles of natural
justice, of fairness and decency reaching at times to the most scrupulous
sense of honor.
The limitations of time oblige me to pass, with a bare reference, the
rule of "undivided loyalty, ' the "doctrine of corporate opportunity,"21
the high ethical obligations of fiduciaries and joint adventurers,2 the
principles of unfair competition and unlawful disparagement of producte'
(leaving much to be desired from an ethical standpoint, although the
law is still quite plastic) all of which have grown up as the jurisdiction of
equity developed and progressed. One of the oldest rules of equity was
that it would not grant relief if there was an adequate remedy at law.
19. The Chancery Court had undertaken to forbid a litigant to enforce a common law
judgment obtained by fraud. The reigning monarch, James I, being appealed to, consulted
men learned in the law and decided in favor of his Chancellor.
20. As Justice Cardozo put in: "In the award of equitable remedies there is often an
element of discretion, but never a discretion that is absolute or arbitrary. In equity as
at law there are signposts for the traveler." Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Sahlem, 254
N. Y. 161, 167, 172 N. E. 455, 457 (1930).
21. Foreman v. Foreman, 251 N. Y. 237, 242, 167 N. E. 428, 429 (1929) (per Car-
dozo, J.).
22. Beatty v. Guggenheim Eploration Co., 225 N. Y. 380, 386, 122 N. E. 374, 3890
(1919) (per Cardozo, J.).
23. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 464, 164 N. E. 545, 546 (1929).
24. Guth v. Loft Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A. 2d 503 (1939).
25. In re Ryans' Will, 291 N. Y. 376, 52 N. E. 2d 909 (1943); City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N. Y. 125, 51 N. E. 2d 674 (1943); Albright et al. v. Jefferson
County National Bank, 292 N. Y. 31, 53 N. E. 2d 753 (1944). See also Note, The Fair-
ness Test of Corporate Contracts zith Interested Directors, 61 HAXv. L. RInv. 335 (1948);
Note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1446 (1950); Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar,
48 HARv. L. R-. 1, 8 (1934).
26. See Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HAnv. L. Rmy. 813
(1927); Callmann, False Adverting as a Competitive Tort, 48 CoL. L. Rm. 876 (1948).
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However 'modern ideas about the adequacy of a remedy at law are
changing and expanding. This is notably true about specific perform-
ance-a remedy originally confined primarily to contracts involving
interests in real property, but which is being extended more and more
to cover all kinds of contracts which can be and which should justly
be specifically enforced.17 We are getting away from the doctrine re-
ferred to by Mr. Justice Holmes from which in the light of modern
developments, Sir Frederick Pollock differed, that the "duty to keep a
contract at common law means that you must pay damages if you do not
keep it-and nothing else."28
I cannot refrain from a reference to an extraordinarily powerful dis-
sent by Judge Cardozo in an equity case which, with respect but with
deep conviction, I make bold to say, truly reflects the trend in the law.
In Graf v. Hope Building Cop.,2 ° the Court of Appeals by a vote of
4 to 3 held that, in the absence of fraud, bad faith or unconscionable
conduct, a mortgagee is entitled to enforce a covenant in the mortgage
that after default for twenty days in the payment of any instalment
of interest-the principal sum shall become due; that failure to pay the
interest due because of errors and omissions of employees of the mort-
gagor constitutes no defense to an action brought to foreclose the mort-
gage at the expiration of twenty-one days after the default. In one of
his few dissenting opinions, joined in by Judges Lehman and Kellogg,
Chief Judge Cardozo took issue with the majority of the court. It was
an opinion skillfully marshaling the authorities in support of the dissent
and vibrant in its appeal to principles of natural justice. In the course
of that opinion, Judge Cardozo said:
"There is no undeviating principle that equity shall enforce the covenants of a
mortgage, unmoved by an appeal ad misericordiam, however urgent or affecting. The
development of the jurisdiction of the chancery is lined with historic monuments
that point another course .... Equity follows the law, but not slavishly nor always
(Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U. S. 182, 192). If it did, there could never be
occasion for the enforcement of equitable doctrine (13 Halsbury, Laws of England,
p. 68).
"Let the hardship be strong enough, and equity will find a way, though many a
formula of inaction may seem to bar the path."80
There is a conflict as to whether there is a so-called "right of privacy"
27. See the modern rule concerning mutuality of remedy as announced in Epstein v.
Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 490, 493, 135 N. E. 861, 862 (1922).
28. See HoLmEs, The Path of the Law, in Cor.LrrmD LEGAL PAPEaS 175 (1921). See
also 1 HOLMEs-PoLL Oc LETTERs 21, 80 (Howe ed. 1941); 2 id. 201, 233; Hoixas, Tn.
Corm'oN LAW 301 (1881).
29. 254 N. Y. 1, 171 N. E. 884 (1930).
30. Id. at 13, 171 N. E. at 888.
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at common law derived from principles of natural justice. In the well-
known case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co?' our Court of
Appeals held not, but the decision by a divided court aroused such
strong disapproval that at the next session of the Legislature a limited
right of privacy was established by statute? - In Georgia, on the other
hand, the ruling in the Roberson case was rejected and a right of privacy
there upheld largely on principles of natural right and justice." The
flood of litigation anticipated when our statute was enacted has not at
all materialized. We have been able to deal effectively with unauthorized
use of names or pictures for essentially commercial or advertising pur-
poses but are still endeavoring case by case as they come up, to balance
the individual's right "to be let alone," with our fundamental right of
freedom of the press.
Occasionally we encounter a decision that shakes our faith in the
progress of the law along lines of natural justice. In the face of a particu-
larly strong dissent the Supreme Court of one of our sister states has
held that the fact that one party to a contract creating a joint and
survivorship account murdered the other party did not divest the mur-
derer of his vested interest in the account in the absence of a statute to
that effect. The court said:
"Counsel insist that Tego's right should be denied him because to allow, it would
be in contravention of sound public policy and place a premium on murder. We are
not subscribing to the righteousness of Tego's legal status; but this is a court of
law and not a theological institution. We have no power to attaint Tego in any
way, shape, or form. Property cannot be taken from an individual who is legally
entitled to it because he violates a public policy. Property rights are too sacred to
be subjected to a danger of that character. We experience no satisfaction in holding
that Tego is entitled to this account; but that is the law, and we must so find." 34
What a pity: to feel compelled to reach such a decision "when one is
searching for justice as one must." As the learned dissenting Justice
said: "It is always hard to be forced to sacrifice the right for the sake
31. 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902).
32. Cf. N. Y. Crv. RGzrs LAw §§ 50, 51. See also Warren and Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HAnv. L. RIv. 193 (1890); and Sidis v. F. R. Publishing Corp., 113 F. 2d
806 (2d Cir. 1940); see also Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy, 4S
COL. L. REv. 713 (1948).
33. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 6S (1905).
34. Oleff et al. v. Hodapp et al., 129 Ohio St. 432, 438, 195 N. E. 838, 841 (1935).
Accord, Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. 2d 872 (1950). Contra, Sherman et al. v.
Weber et al., 113 N. J. Eq. 451, 167 AUt. 517 (1933) semblc; Bryant v. Bryant, 193
N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188 (1930); Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S. W. 2d 757
(1930) ; Bierbauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N. Y. Supp. 176 (4th Dep't 1935);
30 HAnv. L. REv. 622 (1917); Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (18S9);
cf. Jones v. Maynard, 1 T. L. R. 700, 702 (1951).
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of a syllogism. We are not required to do so in the instant case. Reason
and authority sustain the conclusion that the murderer cannot recover
the amount of the deposit.)35
Contracts and Commercial Morality
In the field of contract we find the same progressive development,
although, in this branch of law, many of the reforms have been accom-
plished by statute. Here, while certainty and stability have been primary
concerns, they have often been made to yield, by the creative judicial
process and by appropriate legislation, to the more imperative demands
of fair and just dealing. 6 The doctrine of consideration has received
many a dent through judicial decision and, by means of promissory
estoppel, has been stripped of much of its ancient rigidity. "The law
has outgrown the primitive stage of formalism when the precise word
was the sovereign talisman and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader
view today. A promise may be lacking and yet the whole writing may
be instinct with an obligation imperfectly expressed.""7 We encounter
many instances in the law of contract where the precise legal formula is
made subservient to the demands of fair dealing. There is for example
the rule that "an omission both trivial and innocent ... will not always
be the breach of a condition to be followed by a forfeiture.... Some-
thing doubtless may be said on the score of consistency and certainty
in favor of a stricter standard. The courts have balanced such considera-
tions against those of equity and fairness and found the latter to be
the weightier. . . The willful transgressor must accept the penalty of
his transgression. For him there is no occasion to mitigate the rigor of
implied conditions. The transgressor whose default is unintentional and
trivial may hope for mercy if he will offer atonement for his wrong."88
Charitable subscriptions have been enforced by the application of the
doctrine of consideration as qualified by the ethical principle of promis-
sory estoppel. To give a third party beneficiary, a stranger to the
contract, a right to recover thereunder was "anathema in its beginnings
to those who were inclined to put symmetry in the first place and fair-
ness and common sense in the second." '9 By judicial decision in this
35. Oleff et al. v. Hodapp et al., 129 Ohio St. 432, 447, 195 N. E. 838, 844 (1939).
36. "We are told at times that change must be the work of statute, and that the func-
tion of the judicial process is one of conservation merely. But this is historically untrue,
and were it true, would be unfortunate. Violent breaks with the past must come, indeed,
from legislation, but manifold are the occasions when advance or retrogression Is within
the competence of judges as their competence has been determined by practice and tradi-
tion." CAaoozo, TnE PAARoxEs or LEGAL SCIENCE 7 (1928).
37. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 91, 118 N. E. 214 (1917).
38. Jacobs and Young v. Kent, 230 N. Y. 239, 242, 244, 129 N. E. 889, 890, 891 (1921).
39. Bristol v. Woodward, 251 N. Y. 275, 288, 167 N. E. 441, 446 (1929).
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state in Larwrence v. Fox, the right of a third party beneficiary to
recover on the contract was firmly established and that principle has
been extended in the later cases.
By legislation, for the most part recommended by the Law Revision
Commission of this State, the presence or absence of a seal upon a writ-
ten instrument is now without legal effect. One of the great accomplish-
ments of Lord Mansfield was the creation of a body of Commercial
Law resulting from the absorption into the common law of many of the
customs of the Law Merchant. In 1765 in Pillans v. Van Mierop,4"
he laid down the rule that a promise in writing made in or as part of a
business transaction was binding without any consideration. There was
no authority for this holding in the common law but Lord Mansfield said,
"In commercial cases amongst merchants the want of consideration is
not an objection." His view was that "the ancient notion about the
want of consideration was for the sake of evidence only."' This hold-
ing, however, was overruled in the later English cases. Our Law Revision
Commission has not gone to the extent of Lord Mansfield's holding but
it has eliminated the necessity for consideration in many situations and
it is to be hoped that the day is not far distant, when as Holdsworth
pointed out in his History of English Law: "All lawful agreements should
be valid contracts, if the parties intended by their agreement to affect
their legal relations, and either consideration was presdnt, or the agree-
ment was put into writing and signed by all the parties thereto."42 The
time would seem to be opportune, moreover, for a reexamination and
revision of the provisions of the Statute of Frauds relating to the sale
of goods which have so often operated to accomplish, rather than to
prevent, commercial fraud and perjury and have resulted in endlesslitigation."
The marked change in the attitude of the law towards commercial
morality fully establishes the main thesis of this lecture. The old indi-
vidualistic, laissez faire concept which was the basis of caveat emptor
has been discarded in favor of rules emphasizing fairness in business
dealings, and recognizing new and higher standards of business ethics
and of the morals of the market place. Caveat venditor has, to a large ex-
tent, replaced caveat erwptor4 The recognition of deceit as a distinct
40. 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
41. 3 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1765).
42. Id. at 1669, 97 Eng. Rep. at 1038.
43. 8 HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY or ExrGLISH LAW 48 (1926). For some changes in the New
York law, see Shientag, Lord Mansfield Reviited-A Modem Assessment, 10 Form. L.
RPnv. 345, 367 (1941), reprinted in AMouLDms or LwAL THOuGHT 99, 131, 132 (1943).
44. See the criticism of the Statute of Frauds as relating to the sale of goods in
51 L. Q. RLy. 95 (1935).
45. Walton Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YA.= L. J. 1133 (1931).
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legal wrong, the broadening of its application so that silence itself may
constitute fraud and deception under certain circumstances, 40 relief
from mutual mistake of fact and later for unilateral mistake under
appropriate conditions, the granting of relief for mistake of law, pro-
tection of the fool from the knave in connection with misrepresentation,
the broadening of the rule of justifiable reliance, the extension of the
doctrine of express and implied warranties, T the action for inducing
breach of contract, 48 are some of the steps taken by the law to promote
commercial morality. By the Securities and Exchange Act and the law
creating the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Pure Food and
Drug Act, unfair and misleading business practices are regulated to an
extent undreamed of at common law. Instead of granting monopolies
as was done in early English legal history, monopolies and combinations
in restraint of trade are sternly repressed by law; perhaps some keen
minds may, in the future, be able to formulate more definite rules in
this field for the guidance of businessmen who really wish to comply
with the law.
Torts
Much progress has been made in the law of torts along the lines of
natural justice. There is no branch of the law in which the creative
judicial process has a wider range. It is here that the moral sense should
bring about a harmony between present rules and present needs.
In the course of time absolute liability gave way to liability for fault,
to return in part to absolute liability on an insurance basis, as under
our Workmen's Compensation statutes. Apart from statute, the trend
in the law of torts today is that the ethical quality of the defendant's act
is the measure of liability not just the final act done. The early common
law gave remedies for infringement of the safety or liberty of an indi-
vidual and for injury to his property. Gradually under the decisions,
remedies for slander and libel, deceit and malicious prosecution arose.
The independent tort of negligence sprang from the needs of the indus-
trial age. Unfortunately the prevailing economic viewpoint engrafted
upon the doctrines of negligence and contributory negligence the harsh
judge-made rules of fellow servant and assumption of risk-of which
by now the law has. for the most part, rid itself.
The conception of tort, from an early date, has been a fluid one."
46. Cf. Donovan v. Aeolian Co., 270 N. Y. 267, 271, 200 N. E. 815, 816 (1936).
47. See Warranties of Kind and Quality under the Uniform Revised Sales Act, 57 YALE
L. J. 1389 (1948).
48. Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
49. The categories of negligence, for example, are never dosed. In Paris v. Stepney
Metropolitan Borough Council, 65 T. L. R. 723 (1949), the Court of Appeal held that as
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In 1762 Pratt, C. J., said: "This action is for a tort; torts are infinitely
various, not limited or confined, for there is nothing in nature but may
be an instrument of mischief."' The law of tort is constantly expanding
and "the idea of its being cribbed, cabined and confined in a set of
pigeon holes is untenable. Sometimes old torts are expanded and new
torts are developed so slowly and cautiously that they tend to mask
the fact that they have been created for they have often come into
existence only by a series of analogical extensions spread over a long
period of time. '
In 1893, Lord Bowen expressed the view that "At common law there
was a cause of action whenever one person did damage to another wil-
fully and intentionally, and without just cause or excuse."52 A similar
rule was announced by the Supreme Court of the United States speaking
through Mr. Justice Holmes.P In 1946, in the case of Advance Music
Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., Chief Judge Loughran speaking for
a unanimous Court of Appeals, in a holding which is a landmark in our
law, applied the principle approved by Lord Bowen and Mr. Justice
Holmes, to a specific pending action saying that it was unnecessary to
"decide anything in respect of the nature of the judgment to which
plaintiff may be entitled." It is enough that there is stated "a case for
relief either at law or in equity. ' r5r
For every unjustifiable wrong there is a remedy-whether or not you
can tag the wrong with a specific label. Is not this of the essence of
natural justice, particularly in view of the trend towards extension of
what is "unjustifiable" as applied for example to spite fences, the use
and diversion of surface and underground waters on one's own property,
and the inducing of breach of contract or expectation cases. Damnurm
absque injuria is heard less and less in the law as the years go by.
Many important reforms have been effected in the law of torts by
statute where the unjust, outworn rules were considered too firmly in-
trenched to be dealt with by the creative judicial process. Under the
it was not the duty of the defendants to provide goggles for workmen who had two good
eyes so as to guard them against metal chips, there could be no duty to supply them to
plaintiff merely because having only one eye the consequences to him would be more
serious than they would be to an ordinary man. The House of Lords reversed. "I cannot
accept the view neatly summarized by Asquith, L. J., that the greater risk of injury is,
but the risk of greater injury is not, a relevant circumstance." [1951] A. C. 367, 375. See
also 67 L. Q. Rav. 281 (1951).
50. Chapman v. Pickersgill, 2 Wils. 145, 146, 95 Eng. Rep. 734 (1762).
51. Wnu=D, Trmoor or TH.E LAw oF TORTS 15 (3d ed. 1946).
52. Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co., [1893] 1 Ch. 413, 422.
53. Aikins v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 204 (1904).
54. 296 N. Y. 79, 70 N. E. 2d 401 (1946).
55. Id. at 84, 70 N. E. 2d at 403.
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common law there was no liability for tort resulting in death and actions
for personal injury died with the wrongdoer. The first unjust rule was
abolished in England by Lord Campbell's Act. Our state constitution
preserves the right of recovery in death cases." The rule that actions
for injury to person or property die with the wrongdoer was abolished
in this state, but not until 1935, on the recommendation of our Law
Revision Commission5 7 Similarly, on the recommendation of that Com-
mission, there was abolished the unjust rule that the negligence of a
parent or other custodian might be imputed to the infant5 8 It is ex-
pected that, at the next session of the Legislature, the Law Revision
Commission will again recommend a bill providing generally for contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors.
A recent case, decided by a divided Court of Appeal in England, deal-
ing with liability to third persons for the negligent preparation of
accounts is reminiscent of Judge Cardozo's well-known opinion on that
subject in Ultramares Corp. v. ToucheY0 The scholarly note about the
case prepared for the Law Quarterly Review by its learned editor Pro-
fessor Arthur L. Goodhart reads as follows:
"There can be little doubt that Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. (1951) 1 T. L. R.
371 will give rise to more debate than any other case in recent years. It is
fortunate therefore that the facts are not in dispute, leaving a pure question of
law for decision. The plaintiff was prepared to invest £2,000 in the X Company,
but before doing so he Wished to be satisfied concerning its financial position. The
managing director of the company thereupon showed him the accounts which had
been prepared by the defendants, a firm of accountants. The accounts were produced
to the plaintiff by the defendants' employee who knew for what purpose they were
required. Unfortunately the accounts had been carelessly prepared, and were grossly
defective. Relying on the accounts the plaintiff invested £2,000 in the company,
and lost the whole amount when the company had to be wound up without any
assets. The plaintiff brought the present action against the defendants claiming
damages for negligence. Lloyd-Jacob, J., dismissed the action, holding that the
accountants were under no duty of care to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal
(Cohen and Asquith, L. JJ., Denning, L.J. dissenting) dismissed the plaintiff's
appeal."6o
I commend to your consideration the note and the three opinions of
the Lord Justices, the dissent being an unusually spirited one for an
English high court. Apparently the case stands for the proposition that
in the absence of fraud, 1 an obligation to take care in making statements
56. N. Y. CONST. Art. I, § 16.
57. N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAW §§ 118, 119.
58. N. Y. Dor. RELa. LAW § 73.
59. 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931). See PROSSER, TORTS § 87 (1941).
60. 67 L. Q. REv. 173 (1951).
61. The English definition of what constitutes fraud at common law may not be as
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could arise only out of a contractual duty owed by the defendant to
the plaintiff or a fiduciary relationship between the parties and that in
any event a duty to third persons to take care arose only where the
result of a failure would cause physical damage to person or property.
Judge Cardozo's opinion was quoted from at length in one of the pre-
vailing opinions. The dissenting Lord Justice argued that, in the instant
case, the defective accounts, prepared by the defendants, were presented
by them to the plaintiffs with the knowledge that they would rely on
them, whereas in the Ultramares case the negligent representations were
to an indeterminate class. The prevailing Lord Justices apparently saw
no difference in principle. It will be interesting to see what the House
of Lords will make of it.6
2
The classic pronouncement of Lord Atkin in the form the "You
must not injure your neighbor" rule bears directly on the main thesis
of this lecture. It was made in the great case of Donoghue v. Stevenson'
(the snail-in-the-bottle case) as follows:
"The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other sys-
tems as a species of 'culpa,' is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of
moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. But acts or omissions which
any moral code would censure cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give
a right to every person injured by them to demand relief. In this way rules of law
arise which limit the range of complainants and the extent of their remedy. The
rule that you are to love your neighbour, becomes in law, you must not injure your
neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted
reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbor. Who, then, in law is
my neighbour? The answer seems to be-persons who are so directly affected by
my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected
when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question."04
What Judge Cardozo characterized as "the assault upon the citadel
of privity" is continuing to exert its influence upon the development of
the law along ethical lines. His opinions in this field may be found in
such cases as MacPkerson v. Buick Motor Co., 5 Glanzer v. Shepard50
and Ultrarnares Corp. v. Touche6 7
broad as that adopted in New York cases. Compare Holdsworth, Equity, 51 L. Q. Pm-.
146, 147 (1935), with Ultramnares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).
62. See the scholarly analysis of this case and the relevant authorities in Seavey,
Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.-Negligent Misrepresentation by Accountants, 67 L. Q.
Rxv. 466 (1951); see also Morison, Liability in Negligence for False Statement, 67 L. Q.
REv. 212 (1951).
63. [1932] A. C. 562.
64. Id. at 580.
65. 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
66. 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
67. 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931).
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It is appropriate at this time to call attention to a number of recent
cases, challenged in other jurisdictions, in which recoveries have been
allowed despite the novelty of the action. 8 Without expressing any
opinion as to their correctness I refer to them as indicating the marked
trend in the law along the lines of natural justice and right. These cases
have allowed recovery to minor children against a woman for alienating
the affections of their father and inducing him to leave home and live
with her."9 The same rule has been applied to the enticement of a
mother in a particularly appealing and well-reasoned opinion by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota:
"The Common Law does not consist of absolute, fixed and inflexible rules, but
rather of broad and comprehensive principles based on justice, reason and common
sense .... These principles are susceptible of adaptation to new conditions, interests,
relations and usages as the progress of society may require." 70
Other Branches of the Law; Practice and Procedure
We have considered the progress, along lines of natural justice and
morality, in the three main fields of the civil law. Many and important
have been advances in other branches of the substantive law which of
necessity cannot here be discussed. Great reforms in Pleading and Prac-
tice have been accomplished. It is a far cry, for example, from the rigid,
68. "This argument about the novelty of the action does not appeal to me. It has
been put fonvard in all the great cases which have been milestones of progress in our
law and it has nearly always been rejected. If one reads Ashby v. White, Pasley v. Free-
man and Donoghue v. Stevenson one finds that in each of them the judges were divided
in opinion. On the one side there were the timorous souls who were fearful of allowing
a new cause of action. On the other side there were the bold spirits who were ready to
allow it if justice so required. It was fortunate for the common law that the progressive
view prevailed." Denning, L. J., dissenting, in Candler v. Crane, Christmas and Co.,
I T. L. R. 371, 378 (1951). See also Pollock, Judicial Caution and Valour, 45 L. Q. Rv.
293 (1929). The cases referred to in the foregoing quotation from Lord Justice Denning
are as follows: Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938 (1703), rev'd, 1 Eng. Rep. 417 (1704)
(an action on the case lies by a burgess against the returning officer of the borough for
refusing his vote at an election of members to serve in Parliament); Pasley v. Freeman,
3 T. R. 51, 100 Eng. Rep. 450 (1789) (deceit as an independent tort); and Donoghue v.
Stevenson, [13921 A. C. 562 (liability to third person for injury through finding snail
negligently allowed to get into a bottle of ginger-beer).
69. Daily v. Prarker, 152 F. 2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Johnson v. Lugman, 330 111. App.
598, 71 N. E. 2d 810 (1947).
70. Miller, et a!. v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 406, 37 N. W. 2d 543, 547 (1949). See
also Heck v. Schupp. 394 Ill. 296, 68 N. E. 2d 464 (1946); 20 CoRNnL L. Q. 255 (1935).
Contra: Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N. Y. Supp. 912 (Sup. Ct. 1934);
Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 56 A. 2d 768 (1947); 83 U. oF PA. L. RV. 276 (1934).
It should be noted that in New York, in 1935, the causes of action for alienation of
affections, criminal conversation, seduction and breach of promise to marry were abolished.
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT Art. 2-A.
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technical common law writs and procedure to the successful "revolt
against formalism" in this field of the law. This reached its high point
in New York in the enactment of the Field Code of 1848, with abolition
of the different common law forms of action and the union of legal and
equitable remedies in a single form of action: "the civil action of the
Code." How different from the common law rule was the pronounce-
ment, for instance, of the Court of Appeals (per Desmond, J.) that "the
question for us is whether the requisite allegations of any valid cause
of action cognizable by the state courts 'can be fairly gathered from all
the averments.' ""
Many indeed have been the improvements in our system of civil
practice-improvements too numerous even for mention. Outstanding
among them is the remedy of summary judgment, a powerful weapon
to defeat expeditiously the assertion of claims and defenses which raise
no triable issue-a remedy which should be broadened in New York
along the lines of the Federal Rules of Civil Practice to cover every kind
of action or defense. There is the remedy of declaratory judgment far
reaching in its social and economic implications, the bounds of which
should be more clearly defined by appropriate rule. We have the system
of pre-trial practice patterned on the old English summons for direc-
tions; in actual practice however, in the New York State courts, this
important procedural device is used primarily, if not entirely, to attempt
to effectuate settlements; it by no means follows the English procedure
under which all interlocutory applications are made and disposed of,
and the issues defined, at one time.
By the development of methods of free and non-technical discovery,
inspection, examination before trial, and demand for admission of the
genuineness of a paper or of any specific fact or facts (not resorted to
here anywhere like it is in England) our civil procedure has adopted as
its policy the principle that a litigant should reveal rather than conceal
his case before trial. The trial tends to become an earnest search for
truth rather than a battle of wits.
Interpleader practice has been simplified and broadened. Amend-
ments to pleadings, substantial in character, are today freely allowed
and there is considerable latitude permitted for the joinder of causes
of action and the interposition of counterclaims. Statutes of Limitations
have been changed to the end that stale claims may be more effectively
barred. Broad provisions for arbitration have furnished the commercial
community and others with a prompt, informal remedy. The relief af-
71. Condon v. Associated Hospital Service, 287 N. Y. 411s 414, 40 N. E. 2d 230, 231
(1942).
72. Cf. X Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 449a.
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forded by arbitration can only be approximated by the establishment of
a commercial court with informal, expeditious procedure presided over
by judges experienced in commercial problems. The abbreviated record
on appeal, while of acknowledged desirability, is still largely, with us
in this state, the expression of a hope rather than a reality; much more
should be done to make it effective.
At this point it may be appropriate to refer to right of trial by jury
in civil actions. The historical reasons for trial by jury, which made it
one of the outstanding features in the development of the common law,
have today largely disappeared. Yet the right to trial by jury in civil
actions is frozen into the Constitution of our State. That provision, it
is submitted, should be defrosted and made flexible and discretionary
with the legislature. In certain types of actions such as divorce, libel
and slander, false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and
violation of the civil rights law, the right to trial by jury should continue
to be preserved by constitutional mandate. But as to all other civil
causes trial by jury should be left to the discretion of the legislature and
the courts. In England today there is no right to trial by jury in any
civil action except pursuant to direction of the court, or of the master.
The right to trial by jury in all forms of commercial litigation is an
anachronism. To have one judge try the most important and compli-
cated equity case and a judge together with a jury of twelve try the
simplest kind of commercial litigation no longer makes sense. There is
to be sure, greater room for a jury in negligence cases because of possi-
ble variations in assessing damages but that presents a problem the
solution of which should be left to the legislature and the courts rather
than embodied in the fundamental law of the state.
An improvement was made when the requirement for a unanimous
verdict in a civil action was removed by legislation and a verdict of not
less than five-sixths of the jurors substituted. So too the provision for
alternate jurors in a case likely to be a protracted one has prevented
many a mistrial because of the disability of a juror."2 Largely because of
the constitutional protection of trial by jury we are still struggling with
the difference between the right to direct the verdict in a jury case and
the right to set it aside as against the overwhelming weight of the
credible evidence and to order a new trial. We had thought that this
problem was well on its way to solution as the result of the enactment
of Section 457-A of the Civil Practice Act which provides that the "judge
may direct the verdict when he would have set aside a trial verdict as
against the weight of the evidence." Notwithstanding the specific lan-
guage used our courts have decided that Section 457-A added nothing
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to the pre-existing law on the subject; that it was simply declaratory
of the common law. 3
The Judicial Council, established in 1934, is engaged in a continuous
study of civil practice and procedure and has made numerous recom-
mendations to the legislature for improvements which have been enacted
into law. Fundamentally, it is my firm conviction that we are dealing
with civil practice and procedure in entirely the wrong way. The legis-
lature should delegate to the courts the power to make and revise the
rules of civil practice and procedure along the same lines, and subject
to the same safeguards as were provided when the Congress delegated
to the Supreme Court of the United States the power to make and
revise Federal Rules of Civil Practice. With the aid of an advisory com-
mittee named by the Supreme Court the Federal Rules of Civil Practice
were adopted; they are a model of their kind and furnish adequate
machinery for needed, periodical revision.
In matters of evidence and trial practice much progress has been
made in the law. The disqualifications because of interest have been
virtually eliminated. Among the more recent improvements in the law
of evidence are amendments permitting the broad use of records kept
in the regular course of business;74 allowing contradiction of a witness
by proof of a prior inconsistent statement made by him in writing or
under oath, "irrespective of the fact that the party has called the wit-
ness or made the witness his own";75 and the abolition of the require-
ment that an exception must be taken to an adverse ruling with respect
to the admissibility of evidence.7
There is still a difference of opinion as to whether judges in our state
courts have the right to comment on the evidence in charging a jury.
This doubt should be removed and our state judges given the same
powers in that regard as are exercised by judges in our federal courts
and in England.
Delay in Tort Actions
The greatest dissatisfaction with the civil law in this community today
is the delay, the unconscionable delay, in the trial of tort jury cases-
most of them arising from motor vehicle accidents on our highwaysY7
73. Bank of United States v. Mlanheim, 264 N. Y. 45, 189 N. E. 776 (1934); Blum v.
Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 292 N. Y. 241, 54 N. E. 2d 809 (1944); Ruthzer v. Bass
Dress Corp., 264 App. Div. 372, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 473 (1st Dep't 1942); Matter of Whipple,
294 N. Y. 292, 62 N. E. 2d 76 (1944).
74. Cf. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 374-a.
75. N. Y. Cry. PRAc. ACT § 343-a.
76. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 445.
77. Another justifiable cause for dissatisfaction is the multiplicity of appms and the
failure to provide for counsel fees as part of the costs where a litigant, ultimately success-
ful, has had one or more appeals forced upon him.
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The calendar in these cases, in the Supreme Court of New York County
is almost four years behind. The delay in Bronx County and in the
City Court while not so great is quite substantial. What shall we do
about it? Steps have been taken piecemeal, to be sure, but important
and helpful, to' reduce this congestion. For example, the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Court has been increased from $1,000 to $3,000. The
jurisdiction of the City Court will, by constitutional amendment be in-
creased from $3,000 to $6,000.78 The Appellate Division, it is to be
hoped, may also be given the right to utilize our judicial manpower by
transferring judges as needed from one court to another.70 A system of
preferences has been adopted designed indirectly to have cases tried in
the court in which, because of the nature and extent of the injuries
received, such cases properly belong. It would seem that by constitu-
tional amendment, the courts should be enabled, under appropriate safe-
guards, to transfer cases directly.
But those calendars are continuing to fall behind and small wonder l
The report of the State Motor Vehicle Bureau gives the following
significant figures concerning reported motor vehicle accidents for Great-
er New York for the year 1950. Population, 7,454,995; Vehicle Regis-
tration, 1,350,526; Accidents, 54,395; Deaths, 554; Injuries (more than
one in the same accident), 72,244. There is nothing fanciful about this.
These accidents take place and injured persons and the kin of those
killed (despite conflicting claims of fault and liability) want redress.
Taking account also of the large number of other accidents from various
causes and of other torts you can readily understand why it is that
these actions are beginning to cause parts of our judicial structure to
burst at the seams.
It is essential therefore that a Legislative Commission be created to
look into this entire problem. This Commission should consider among
other things, the organization, jurisdiction and business of our courts
of civil jurisdiction (limited if you will to the City of New York); what
consolidations, if any, of those courts should be effected; the advisa-
bility of modifying the constitutional provisions for trial by jury in
civil cases, and giving the Legislature at least a limited power to deal
therewith particularly in connection with commercial and negligence
actions; the adoption of a rule of court giving a preference on the jury
calendar in certain classes of negligence actions where a plaintiff waives
but a defendant demands a jury trial; the power, under appropriate
safeguards, to transfer negligence actions, to the courts of appropriate
78. The Amendment became effective January 1, 1952.
79. Such a proposed constitutional amendment passed one Legislature in 1951. See
N. Y. CONST. Art. XIX, § 1.
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jurisdiction, in which they properly belong; judicial supervision over
contingent fees in negligence actions; provisions for adequate supervision
by the Appellate Divisions of the work of the courts within their re-
spective jurisdictions; the methods to be adopted to reduce motor vehicle
accidents and in what manner the accident cases can be most effectively
dealt with in our courts. This mass of motor vehicle cases, clogging our
court calendars, adversely affects the efficiency of the administration of
justice generally. The accidents are real. Those of the injured, who are
entitled to recover, should not be subjected to unreasonable delay, often
resulting in a complete denial of justice to them. If the courts are unable
to deal with these motor vehicle injury actions, justly and expeditiously,
some system along the lines of the Workmen's Compensation Law may
have to be adopted."0
Crimiual Law
In no branch of law has there been manifested a greater change than
in our attitude to the criminal offender. The whole history of the crimi-
nal law is the transition from brutality and stupidity to humanity and
enlightenment. The hideous story of man's inhumanity to man in the
enforcement of the criminal law has often been recounted. We are
shocked when we realize how those living in the eighteenth century tol-
erated, "with fearful composure," the horrors of the jails, the brutality
of the criminal code and the savagery of the press-gang. Changes for
the better have come in the course of time, immense changes, but they
have been so slow and gradual that we are hardly conscious of them.
From the brutal, savage and severe punishment for crime we have pro-
gressed steadily along the lines of crime prevention and detection and
have placed the emphasis upon speedy, certain punishment and upon the
rehabilitation of the criminal offender. The trend has been to put the
solely punitive aspect of our criminal law in the background and to
limit, within the strictest necessary bounds, the suffering inflicted by law.
Advances in medicine, particularly in physiology, psychiatry and
psychology have thrown much light on what were previously considered
imponderables and have contributed effectively to the more scientific
sentencing and treatment of criminal offenders. Children and youth
offenders' courts, family courts, our systems of probation and parole and
the attempted individualization of sentences imposed, are all steps in
the right direction. There are many who feel that we have reached the
point where the prevention of crime, within certain limitations, is a
purchaseable commodity-purchaseable in terms of adequate police
forces, modern prisons, and enlightened procedures in trials and sen-
80. See Shientag, Motor Vehicle Accidents and the Law, 1 BuLuxn oF TU NEw Yo n
STATE BAR Ass'N 134 (1929).
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tences. The prevention of crime is purchaseable in increased emphasis
on the social, economic, physical and mental conditions which tend to
breed crime and disrespect for law and order. Judges are becoming more
receptive to training in criminology and are acquainting themselves with
what goes on in the different penal institutions.
The rights of the person charged with crime should always be re-
spected but we should not lose sight of the fact that the community
also is entitled to protection. Abuses led the judges in 1785 to lay down
the law that a "confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope,
or the torture of fear comes in so questionable a shape that no credit
ought to be given to it and therefore it is rejected." 81 We have laws
requiring the prompt arraignment of prisoners charged with crime. The
courts should not consider themselves powerless, within reasonable limits,
to enforce this legal mandate. There is a serious question whether there
shall be continued the rule in this state which allows evidence obtained
by unlawful means to be used on a criminal trial. The Federal rule is
to the contrary and is more in accord with reason.
The revelations of the Kefauver Committee and of the New York
State Crime Commission have stirred the conscience of the American
people. Few were prepared for the unsavory disclosures of widespread
organized crime on the part of racketeers, police and public officials
generally. No penalty is too severe for traffickers in narcotics who
undermine the moral fibre of our youth and who destroy those unable
to resist the pernicious drugs transported and offered for sale. Punish-
ment-severe punishment of the offendbrs, prevention of the illicit traffic
and the treatment and cure of the victims are probleams pressing for
solution. How to deal effectively with them calls for all the wisdom,
the skill, and the courage of our lawmakers aided and supported by the
bar of the country. Although stressing the humane treatment and re-
habilitation of the criminal offender, it should be recognized that the
primary purpose of the criminal law is the protection of society.
What a difference between denial, under the old common law, of a
defendant's right to counsel, and our present insistence upon it, as a
fundamental right of an accused, to be protected at all times by the
liberal extension of the great moral writ of coram nobis.82 How different
the old practice of executing a convicted defendant, without right of
appeal, from our requirement that every conviction in a case where the
81. Rex. v. Warwickshall, 1 Leach 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783); see the quaint
observation in Rex. v. Thompson, 1 Leach 291, 168 Eng. Rep. 248 (1783). "Too great a
chastity cannot be preserved on this subject." Id. at 293, 168 Eng. Rep. 249. See also
People v. Malinski, 292 N. Y. 360, 55 N. E. 2d 353, rev'd, 324 U. S. 401 (1944).
82. Matter of Bojinoff v. People, 299 N. Y. 145, 85 N. E. 2d 909 (1949); People v.
Guariglia, 303 N. Y. 338, - N. E. 2d - (1951).
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death sentence is imposed must, at the instance of a defendant, go direct-
ly to the highest court of the state for review.
One of the greatest opinions written by Justice Hughes was in the
case of Brown v. Mississippi,3 holding that a trial in a state court, fair
in its fundamentals, is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Speak-
ing for a unanimous court he quoted with approval from Fisher v.
State,4 a Mississippi case where it was held: "The duty of maintaining
the constitutional rights of a person on trial for his life rises above mere
rules of procedure and whenever the court is clearly satisfied that such
violations exist, it will refuse to sanction such violations and will apply
the corrective."815 It is a case which should be read and re-read by all
those who love freedom and justice.
In our own state the Court of Appeals, speaking through Fuld, J.,
recently held: "Vicious though the crime was, convincing though the
evidence of guilt may seem to be, we could affirm only if we were to
announce a doctrine that the fundamentals of a fair trial need not be
respected if there is proof in the record to persuade us of defendants'
guilt. We are not prepared to announce such a doctrine."80
An outstanding need in this branch of our law is a thorough, scientific
study and revision of our Penal Law, our Code of Criminal Procedure
and related statutes. Neither the Law Revision Commission nor the
Judicial Council is equipped for this purpose. What is required is a
temporary legislative commission, with adequate facilities and appropri-
ations for making the necessary studies. There are many matters re-
quiring consideration by such a proposed legislative commission. I have
to limit myself to a few: the right of comment on the failure of a de-
fendant to take the stand;87 the adaptation of the privilege against self-
incrimination to meet the modern needs of society in waging war against
crime; 8 a more scientific definition of legal insanity; a revision of the
distinctions between felonies and misdemeanors and offenses; and a
new, humane method of dealing with paternity proceedings.
At this point also it is important to emphasize, as iMr. Justice Hughes
did, that there is no more serious menace than the discontent which is
fostered by a belief that, because of poverty, the most humble indi-
83. 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
84. 145 Miss. 116, 110 So. 361 (1926).
85. Id. at 134, 110 So. at 365.
86. People v. Mileczko, 298 N. Y. 153, 163, 81 N. E. 2d 65, 69 (1948).
87. See Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1946); N. Y. CoNST. ART. 1, § 6; N. Y.
CooE CaRIX. PROC. §§ 10, 393.
88. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S.
97 (1933); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1935); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.
319, 322, 324 (1937); see note 87 supra.
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vidual cannot enforce his legal rights or adequately defend himself when
charged with crime. The Legal Aid Society is doing excellent work in
this field; undoubtedly more will have to be done in the future.
What the Law is and What it Ought to be
What is Desirable and What is Possible
Our law has reached a point in its development where we are in a
position to examine and appraise it from two angles: what the law is
and what it ought to be; to put it in a different way-what is desirable
and what is possible. The more we narrow the gap, whether by the
creative judicial process or by legislation between what is desirable and
what is possible and between what the law is and what it ought to be,
the better our law will become and the nearer it will be to the realization
of its purpose.
That there are rules of law contrary to moral conceptions is due, not
so much to our mistaken notion of what is right or wrong, as to our
notions of what is possible-that is, what is expedient or practicable.
Certainty and expediency are distinct values and have their place in
the law. It is, however, our task, not to accept blindly the pleas of
certainty and expediency, so temptingly put before us, but to see whether
or not they would really be sacrificed by the adoption of the rule having
an ethical basis-in other words whether the desirable certainty and
expediency cannot fairly be reconciled with the moral considerations
involved.
The history of the law demonstrates that every important legislative
reforrm was accompanied by well-intentioned but dire predictions that it
would be destructive of the law, and would open the flood-gates to litiga-
tion based on fraud and perjury or would permit the use of the law for
improper, reprehensible purposes. The problem centers largely around
what has been called "the difficulties and dangers of proof" and the
harm resulting therefrom. I can only refer briefly to a few concrete
examples by way of illustration relating to rules of law, some of which
can be changed or corrected, if at all, by legislation. Have we not
reached a point in the progress of the law and of medical and psychiatric
science where it would be entirely desirable and safe to abandon the
unjust rule that there can be no recovery in negligence for shock or
mental disturbance, without impact? Many states have abandoned this
rule; it does not seem to be the law in England."9 Lord Macmillan put
it thus: "The crude view that the law should take cognizance only of
89. Bo mF, STUDIES IlN THE LAW Or ToRTs 252 et seq. (1926); cf. Goodrich, Emo-
tional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MicH. L. REv. 497 (1922); 49 HAtv. L. REv.
1033 (1936).
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physical injury resulting from actual impact has been discarded and
it is now well recognized that an action will lie for injury by shock
sustained through the medium of the eye or the ear without direct
contact."9'
Have we not reached a point in medical science where we should
allow a recovery for negligent injuries to an infant en ventre sa mere?
The Court of Appeals said no, by a divided court in Drobner v. Peters,"'
Cardozo, J., dissenting without opinion. Since that decision a number
of states have rejected its holding. Another case involving the same
question may soon be reviewed by the Court of Appeals. 2
There is the doctrine of contributory negligence. It was engrafted
on the concept of negligence, that is, liability for fault only, early in the
industrial age. As applied under modern conditions it has become an
anachronism. The conception that even though a defendant was negli-
gent, an injured plaintiff cannot recover at all, if any careless act on
his part contributed in any way to the occurrence of the accident cer-
tainly is not in accordance with principles of natural justice. As far
back as 1916 Judge Jeremiah Smith, a teacher and authority on the
subject said: "The doctrine of contributory negligence is a decadent
doctrine which will ultimately disappear from the law." Why do we
continue it? England has dealt with it effectively.
On the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor's Law Revision Com-
mittee, made in 1939, Parliament, in 1945, enacted the Law Reform
Contributory Negligence Act. It provides, along the lines of the rule
under the maritime law, that "Where any person suffers damage as a
result partly of his own fault and partly of any other person or persons,
a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the
fault of the person suffering the damage but the damages recoverable
in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the Court thinks
just and equitable having regard to the claimant's share in the responsi-
90. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HAMv. L.
REv. 1033 (1936); Bourhill v. Young, (1943] A. C. 92, 103; 59 L. Q. RE,. 150 (1943);
s CAim. L. J. 265 (1944).
91. 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921). Contra: Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A. 2d
550 (Aid. 1951); see Pomm, IxrTm 'REAAioxS OP LacAL HsRoy 121 (1923); 10 A. L. R.
2d 1059 (1950).
92. See Woods v. Lancet, 278 App. Div. 913, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 417 (Ist Dep't 1951),
rev'd, 303 N. Y. 349, 102 N. E. 2d 691 (1951) (since this lecture was delivered),
holding that Drobner v. Peters, 232 N. Y. 220, 133 N. E. 567 (1921), would no longer
be followed and allowing recovery for pre-natal injuries caused by negligence. "The
precise question for us on this appeal," said Desmond, J., speaking for the majority, "is:
shall we follow Drobner v. Peters, or shall we bring the common law of this State, on
this question, into accord with justice? I think, as New York State's court of last resort,
we should make the law conform to right."
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bility for the damage." This would include injuries to property. The
Act "does not alter the existing law as to determining whether or not
there has been contributory negligence; all that it does is to alter the
law as to the damages recoverable where contributory negligence is
established. . . As to procedure the court must find and record the
total damages which would have been recoverable if the claimant had
not been at fault; if the case is tried with a jury they assess the amount
of the total damages and also the extent to which they are to be
reduced.""3
There has been criticism likewise of the "last clear chance" rule as
it has been laid down by judicial decision in this state. Until, at least,
a very recent Court of Appeals decision which points in a more liberal
direction,94 for the last clear chance doctrine to operate at all, the in-
jured person had to be virtually unconscious or at least in an immobile
position. Even then the doctrine was strictly limited. It "is never
wakened into action unless and until there is brought home to the de-
fendant to be charged with liability a knowledge that another is in a
state of present peril, in which event there must be reasonable effort
to counteract the peril and avert its consequences .... Knowledge there
must be or negligence so reckless as to betoken indifferencee to
knowledge."9"l
The Court of Appeals, in a recent decision without opinion, has ap-
plied the same exemption from liability for negligence to hospitals
organized for profit, as had theretofore been allowed, in the decisions,
to non-profit, charitable hospitals. This entire subject should receive
careful study at the hands of the Law Revision Commission.9
That Commission likewise should study the advisability of amending
the law with respect to signing at the end of the will, and of also amend-
ing Section 347 of the Civil Practice Act prohibiting the testimony of
an interested witness concerning transactions with a decedent. These
93. WNFImLD, TXTBOOK oF TnE LAW or TORT 404, 405, 415-16 (3d ed. 1946).
94. Chadwick v. City of New York, 301 N. Y. 176, 93 N. E. 2d 625 (1950).
95. Woloszynowski v. N. Y. Central R. R., 254 N. Y. 206, 208, 172 N. E. 471, 472
(1930). See also Panarese v. Union Ry., 261 N. Y. 233, 185 N. E. 89 (1933) ; Hernandez
v. Brooklyn & Queens Transit Corp., 259 App. Div. 853, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 511 (2d Dep't),
rev'd, 284 N. Y. 535, 32 N. E. 2d 542 (1940).
96. Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium, Inc., 277 App. Div. 572, 101 N. Y. S. 2d
385 (Ist Dep't 1950), aff'd, 302 N. Y. 870, 100 N. E. 2d 51 (1951). See 29 IowA L. Rav.
624 (1944); 9 U. oF PrirT. L. REv. 253 (1948). See also Schoendorff v. Society of the
New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914); Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hos-
pital, 236 N. Y. 268, 140 N. E. 694 (1923); Butterworth v. Keeler, 219 N. Y. 446, 114
N. E. 803 (1916) ; Hamburger v. Cornell University, 240 N. Y. 328, 148 N. E. 539 (1925);
Sutherland v. N. Y. Polyclinic Medical School & Hosp., 273 App. Div. 29, 75 N. Y. S. 2d
135 (1st Dep't 1947), afi'd, 298 N. Y. 682, 82 N. E. 2d 583 (1949).
[Vol. 21
STREAM OF PROGRESS IN THE LAW
rules designed to prevent fraud tend at times to operate most unjustly.
Surely a better way can be found to deal with them. 7
There has been much adverse comment about the old rule in this
state that equity will not restrain the publication of a libel, even if the
wrongdoer is financially irresponsible. This rule goes back to the case
of Brandreth v. Lanell decided in 1839. It has been criticized as un-
just, archaic and outmoded. It should be noted, however, that the
Appellate Division, First Department, in a recent case, specifically left
this question open. In affirming an order denying a temporary injunc-
tion to restrain the publication of an unauthorized biography, the court
said: "Our affirmance of the order should not be construed as a deter-
mination by this Court that injunctive relief may not be had to restrain
the publication of defamatory statements in a proper case. Suffice it
to say that the record before us does not furnish any proper basis for
the granting of a temporary injunction."" 9
The problem here posed differs from that presented in Near v. Minne-
sota '" where, in one of his most famous opinions, Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, speaking for the majority of the court, held that a newspaper
or periodical could not be restrained from publishing a libel, however,
outrageous, on a public official. Such a prior restraint would be an
invasion of the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and of the
press. After discussing the limitations on this rule, the Chief Justice
specifically said, "Nor are we now concerned with questions as to the
extent of authority to prevent publications in order to protect private
rights according to the principles governing the exercise of the jurisdic-
tion of courts of equity." 01
97. Matter of Winters, 277 App. Div. 24, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 312 (1st Dep't 1950), aqf'd,
302 N. Y. 666, 98 N. E. 2d 477 (1951). See MoncA,;, T=n LAw or Em=c=: So=xn
PROPOSALS rOR ITs Ropar= 23 (1927). An interesting suggestion has been made by an
English writer which might well be explored here. He says: "The formal requirements for
a will are supposed to prevent fraud but it is probable they facilitate far more fraud
upon the wishes of testators than they prevent. Courts should be given discretion when
satisfied that a particular document was intended by the deceased to be his will to admit
such document to probate. This would not encourage slackness in drawing wills for a
person who drew a defective will would still be subject to the risk that the court might
refuse probate. Leave the formal requirements as they are now; in the va-t majority
they would be complied with." WnLLws, Tan RExFoS or TnE LAW, 103 (1950).
98. 8 Paige 24 (N. Y. 1839).
99. Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc., 272 App. Div. 759, 69 N. Y. S. 2d
432, 433 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'g, 188 Misc. 479, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 779 (Sup. Ct.). See Advance
Mlusic Corp. v. American Tobacco Co, 268 App. Div. 707, 711, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 337, 341
(1st Dep't 1945), rev'd, 296 N. Y. 79, 70 N. E. 2d 401 (1946).
100. 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
101. Id. at 716, citing, 29 HARv. L. REv. 640 (1916). Cf. Singer et al. v. Romerrick
Realty Corp., 255 App. Div. 715, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 607 (2d Dep't 1938); Marlin Fire Arms
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And now to a highly debatable subject but one which cannot be ignored
in a lecture dealing with the influence of natural justice on the develop-
ment of the law. "A man stands idly by, and watches a baby drown
in two feet of water, when he could save it with no further inconvenience
to himself than of wetting his hands, gravely offends the code of morals,
but not that of law."'02 That is, I am ashamed to say, Anglo-American
law today and I fear that it can only be changed by statute. Moreover
many good people will oppose such a statute. It is shocking that in our
present state of civilization the common law countries have not put their
stamp of disapproval on this most revolting rule, at least by making it
a criminal offense, punishable by a short term of imprisonment. Diffi-
cult to draft a statute! Not at all; it has been done in several of the
code countries. °3 It will tend to encourage officious intermeddling-
how far fetchedl Suppose instead of one man watching this baby drown,
half a dozen stand by idly. It is easy to make the statute applicable
where there is only one person present in a position to save the child.
But let us at least have some declaration of legal policy by the state
setting its countenance against a violation of a fundamental obligation
of a man living in a civilized society. Condemned by religion,104 con-
demned by every moral instinct, it should be condemned by law.03
True the courts have sought to find some way within the old frame-
work of the common law to impose a legal sanction in the case we are
considering and leading legal scholars have advocated the imposition of
liability, at least some criminal liability by statute.' Liability has been
Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163 (1902), and note on Injunctions Against the
Disparagement of Business Methods and-the Quality of Manufactured Products, 126 N. Y.
L. J. 1624, col. 1 (Dec. 13, 14, 17, 1951).
102. HANBURY, ENGLISH COURTS OF LAW 8 (1944).
103. See e.g., DUTCH PENAL CODE, Art. 450: "He who, seeing another person suddenly
threatened with the danger of death, omits to give or furnish him with assistance, which
he can give or procure without any reasonable fear of danger to himself or others, Is
punished, if the death of the person in distress has resulted, with three months imprison-
ment and fine."
104. "Neither shalt thou stand idly by the blood of thy neighbor." LEvnrcus XIX, 16.
This has been construed to mean when his life is in danger. "Do not stand Idly by,
watching with indifference thy fellow man in mortal danger through drowning, or attacked
by wild animals, or robbers without hastening to his rescue." TALMUD. There is a further
application of this verse by the sages: "if thy fellow man is accused of a crime and evidence
that could clear him of it is in thy possession, thou art not at liberty to keep silent."
105. JERoME HALL, PRINCIPLES or CRIMINAL LAW 247-78 (1947).
106. BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORA.S AND LEGISLATION 322, 323 (1830); Ames, Law
and Morals, 22 HALv. L. REv. 97 (1908); Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a
Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. oF PA. L. REV. 217 (1908); PROSSER, TORTS § 32 (1941);
POUND, LAW AND MORALS 67 et seq. (1924) (and the authorities cited at 69) ; Kirchheimer,
Criminal Omissions, 55 HARv. L. REv. 615 (1942); Moreland, Criminal Negligence and
(Vol. 21
STREAM OF PROGRESS IN THE LAW
imposed where there was a contractual relationship, a relationship in-
volving an element of traditional dependency, although temporary in
character, a relationship of mutual reliance (mountain climbing) and
where one has undertaken and then abandoned the rescue. Some cases
have gone quite far in the absence of statute to reach the desired result.
But at the critical point, practically all of them have drawn back.'0 7
It may not be inapposite here to mention that the common law has
never recognized any unmoral rule such as "necessity knows no law."
There are several famous criminal cases on record in which seamen,
forced to sacrifice some lives to save themselves and others, were con-
victed but received light sentences?0
Regzdatory Legislation
A changing world brought in its train a change in the commonly
accepted functions of government, and has led to a great mass of social,
labor and business legislation. It is not too far back when a woman or
even a child, under the guise of an illusory freedom of contract, could
work any number of hours, for starvation wages, in any kind of unsani-
tary or unsafe surrounding. It was no concern of the government-
laissez faire-let man look after himself; the government had nothing
.to do with his relationships. All that has changed since the end of the
19th century. Regulatory statutes have been enacted that would have
been considered revolutionary, fifty and even twenty-five years ago.
They are now regarded as so essential that what we read about the
opposition they encountered seems almost incredible. They are now
rightly considered as the duty of the government and as vital to the
preservation of the individual rights and liberties which go to make up
our American way of life. Such measures promote rather than diminish
freedom and are for the most part based upon natural justice and
morality. Today liberty is "viewed not negatively or selfishly as a mere
absence of restraint but positively and socially as an adjustment of re-
straints" to fulfill the ideals of freedom rather than to destroy them.
Perhaps the most significant change is that which has taken place in
Crimes by Omission, 32 Ky. L. J. 221 (1944); Perkins, Negati'e Acts in Criminal Law,
22 IowA L. REv. 659, 668 (1937). Compare Orvill Snyder, Liability for Negalke Conduct,
35 VA. L. Rv. 446 (1949).
107. Compare Rex v. Russell, [1933] Vict. L. R. 59 (1932) (failure of husband to pre-
vent wife from drowning their children), with People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 205, 113
N. W. 1128 (1907), and Parrish v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 221 N. C. 292, 20 S. E. 2d
299 (1942), and Depue v. Flatau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N. W. 1 (1907).
108. United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 349, No. 15,382 (D. Me. 1858); United
States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360, No. 15,383 (E. D. Pa. 1842); Regina v. Dudley and
Stephens, 14 Q. B. D. 273 (1884).
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judicial decisions and in statutes in the field of labor relations. I invite
you to read again the famous dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis
in Truax v. Corrigan01 and consider the history of the law governing
relations between employers and employed. In England until 1813, even
the employee's individual freedom to contract was restricted; he was
confronted with laws limiting the amount of wages he might demand.
Until 1824, he was "punishable as a criminal if he combined with his
fellow workmen to raise wages or shorten hours or to affect the business
in any way even if there was no resort to a strike." In the United States
the right to combine and to strike received early recognition, but this
right was regulated largely by judicial decisions. "Judges, being thus
called upon to exercise a quasi-legislative function and weigh relative
social values, naturally differed in their conclusions on such questions." 110
But a reading of the opinion gives the whole story. Suffice it to say
that it is a far cry from the conditions thus portrayed to the enactment
of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction statutes, the National Labor
Relations Act, and their state counterparts. The right to regulate work-
ing conditions and business practices, and to deal with social security
had somewhat analogous histories."' As far back as 1910, Mr. Justice
Hughes said: "Freedom of contract is a qualified and not an absolute
right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract
as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from legis-
lative supervision that wide department of activity which consists of
the making of contracts, or deny to government the power to provide
restrictive safeguards. Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint,
not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in
the interests of the community."" 2
In 1937, Cardozo, J., writing for the majority said, in the Social
Security cases:
"Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or
parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the
Nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the times. . . .The hope behind
109. 257 U. S. 312 (1921).
110. Id. at 354, 365.
111. Compare People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N. Y. 395, 108 N. E. 639 (1915),
%vith People v. Williams, 189 N. Y. 131, 81 N. E. 778 (1907); People v. Balofsky, 167
App. Div. 913, 151 N. Y. Supp. 1135 (2d Dep't 1915); In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98 (1885);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905), and Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908);
Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U. S. 671 (1914); United States v. Butler et al., 297 U. S. 1
(1936), and Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937); Stettler v. O'Hara,
69 Ore. 519, 139 Pac. 743 (1914), aff'd, 243 U. S. 629 (1917); Adkins v. Children's Hospi-
tal, 261 U. S. 525 (1923); People ex rel. Tipaldo v. Morehead, 270 N. Y. 233, aff'd, 298
U. S. 587 (1936), and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
112. Chicago B. & Q. R. R. v. McGlire, 219 U. S. 549, 567 (1911).
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this statute is to save men and women from the rigors of the poor house as well
as from the haunting fear that such a lot awaits them when journey's end is near. 1 3
That reaches close to the point of moral exaltation in a judicial opinion.
The past few decades have witnessed the broadening interpretation
by the Supreme Court of the United States of the "commerce" clause
in such a manner as to permit the exercise of federal power in the fields
of labor, social and economic legislation which theretofore had been
considered to be the function of the respective states. It was recognized
that many of these problems crossed state lines, had become essentially
national in scope, and could be dealt with effectively only on a national
basis. Of course there is such a thing as going too far. The problem for
the future is to maintain the balances between individual freedom and
social duty. That involves the judicious balancing of the forces of indi-
vidual initiative and public regulation.
"The pressing problem," said Justice Hughes in 1920, and we cer-
tainly should hearken to his words today, "is how we are to adapt gov-
ernment to imperative needs and yet remain free.... Adaptation accord-
ing to democratic principles, the growth and development in which
democratic progress consists, must ever be the concern of those who
know how to distinguish between what is vital and what is merely inci-
dental and temporary."" 4
Administrative Agencies
The growth of regulatory legislation inevitably led to the establish-
ment of administrative agencies to carry that legislation into effect. As
Mr. Chief Justice Stone pointed out, of the changes in the law "destined
to have the most far reaching consequences, one is the rise of adminis-
trative agencies, with the accompanying increase of their function and
powers."11 Along with unreasonable delay in the courts and the expense
and multiplicity of appeals the greatest dissatisfaction with the law
comes from the way these agencies function and their methods of
procedure.
I have not the fear expressed by Lord Hewart some years ago in his
book The New Despotism, and reflected by many in this country, that
the growth of administrative agencies will destroy the freedoms which
Anglo-American law fought, through the centuries, to secure and to
maintain. Administrative agencies have their appropriate place in our
democratic form of government. Our task is to make sure that they
113. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 641 (1937).
114. ADDPESS To HARVARD LAW SCHOOL ALumXNI AssocAvxov 31, 34 (June 21, 1920).
115. Stone, Remarks, 1 RacoD or T AssocirAioN or ma BAR or a CinT" or NEw
Yopx 144, 148 (1946).
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function properly and the tests to be applied towards that end are the
requirements of natural justice.
Much of the regulatory legislation that was enacted, of necessity,
had to be more or less general or skeletal in nature. This resulted in the
creation and growth of administrative agencies to carry into effect, by
detailed rules and regulations, which could readily be changed or varied,
the general requirements laid down by the legislature. However, one
of the great difficulties was that some of these agencies were given not
only quasi-legislative powers and powers of investigation and of prosecu-
tion but were also given powers of quasi-judicial determination. In a sense
this violates what has been called in England, the "first and most funda-
mental principle of natural justice, namely, that a man may not be a
judge in his own cause .... The litigant often feels that in the combina-
tion of functions within a single tribunal or agency, he has lost all oppor-
tunity to argue his case to an unbiased official and that he has been
deprived of safeguards that he has been taught to revere."''
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, enacted on the recom-
mendation of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Pro-
cedure, recognized this weakness and by the method of "internal separa-
tion" required that there be set up within each agency a group of semi-
independent hearing officers called examiners, with security of tenure,
to whom alone were to be assigned the initial adjudicating functions of
the agency. This is an important step in the right direction and perhaps
in the future a more radical change may have to be made.
Mr. Justice Hughes, himself, when Governor of New York, had taken
the lead in the creation of a commission to regulate utilities and their
rates, with authority to act free from hampering restrictions. In 1931,
addressing the Federal Bar Association he said: "Experience, expertness
and continuity of supervision, which could only be had by administrative
agencies in a particular field, have come to be imperatively needed.
But these new methods put us to new tests, and the serious question of
the future is whether we have enough of the old spirit which gave us
our institutions to save them from being overwhelmed.""'
In the second Morgan case Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said:
"The vast expansion of this field of administrative regulation in response to the
pressure of social needs is made possible under our system by adherence to the
basic principle that the legislature shall appropriately determine the standards of
administrative action and that in administrative proceedings of a quasi-judicial char-
acter the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play. These demand 'a fair and open hearing,'-essential alike
116. 63 L. Q. REv. 58 (1947).
117. N. Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1931; p. 18, col. 1. See HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUouES
AND THE SUPRME COURT 98 (1951).
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to the legal validity of the administrative regulation and to the maintenance of public
confidence in the value and soundness of this important governmental process.
Such a hearing has been described as an 'inexorable safeguard.'
"The maintenance of proper standards on the part of administrative agencies in
the performance of their quasi-judicial functions is of the highest importance and
in no way cripples or embarrasses the exercise of their appropriate authority. On
the contrary, it is in their manifest interest... if these multiplying agencies deemed
to be necessary in our complex society are to serve the purpose for which they
are created and endowed with vast powers, they must accredit themselves by acting
in accordance with the cherished judicial tradition embodying the basic concepts
of fair play.""-8
What are these basic concepts of "fair play" as we call them or of
the "principles of natural justice" as they are characterized in England.
Concededly they may be summarized as notice of what the charge or
complaint is, an opportunity to be heard, a fair, objective hearing, and
a decision which as to questions of fact is supported by substantial
evidence." 9 I would include as an added requirement a statement of
findings, however informally expressed, giving the reasons for the con-
clusion reached. It is the duty of the courts on review to see that these
requirements of fair play or natural justice are complied with.
Notice and an opportunity to be heard: as far back as 1722 notice
of a quasi-judicial proceeding was held to be indispensable. Sir John
Fortescue said, "The laws of God and man both give the party an oppor-
tunity to make his defence. Even God himself did not pass sentence
upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence."2 0 A fair
objective hearing: one who assumes to act in a judicial or quasi-judicial
capacity "must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides for that
is a duty lying upon every one who decides anything."' 2 '
Findings and conclusions supported as to the facts by substantial evi-
dence: a multitude of decisions and a host of legal articles have been
written on this subject. On questions of law, on questions of jurisdic-
tion and of power, there should be full judicial review by the courts.
It is with respect to judicial review on question of fact that the main
problem arises. Concededly the courts should not substitute their judg-
ment or opinion for that of the administrative agency. On the other
hand, it is equally true that courts should have the power to override
an arbitrary, capricious, unconscionable determination on the facts by
any administrative agency. "Law and arbitrary power," maintained
118. Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 14-15, 22 (1938).
119. Cf. Matter of 67 Liquor Shop Inc. v. O'Connell, 273 App. Div. 68, 75 N. Y. S.
2d 411 (lst Dep't 1947).
120. King v. Chancellor, et a[., 1 Str. 557 (1723).
121. Board of Education v. Rice, [1911] A. C. 179, 182.
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Edmund Burke, "are in eternal enmity." The entire history of Anglo-
American law is the unceasing struggle against arbitrary power, from
whatever source it came. The very essence of liberty is the subjection
of all arbitrary methods to the rule of law.
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 lays down fundamental
requirements of fair play in practice and procedure by administrative
agencies. It was an important step in the right direction and should
have its counterpart in the states. The act is by no means the last
word on the subject and it should be supplemented by continuous, expert
study of how the agencies proceed under it.!2  One of its provisions is
that the reviewing court shall set aside agency action "unsupported by
substantial evidence" and that the court "shall review the whole record
or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party .. .. M23 Acts
dealing with specific administrative agencies contain substantially simi-
lar provisions and certainly that should be the minimum standard for
judicial review. I should have supposed that meant an examination by
the reviewing court of the entire record (or such portions as the parties
submitted to it) in order to determine whether there is room for a
reasonable, legitimate difference of opinion concerning the findings of
the agency; if there is, the judicial function comes to an end; if there is
not, it is the right and the duty of the courts to set them aside. Chief
Justice Hughes held that "substantial evidence" meant ". . . such rele-
vant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion."'2 4
. Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are
said to have opened "a new chapter in the long controversy concerning
judicial control over administrative determinations.' 2 6 If, as those deci-
sions indicate, the scope of judicial review has been broadened by the
Administrative Procedure Act and similar provisions in other statutes,
that certainly is a step in the right direction. I had thought that the
process of judicial review had always been what those two cases now
say it is. 2 In any event the entire problem of practice and procedure
122. See Parker, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in Overestimation, 60
YALE L. J. 581 (1951); Rhyne, The Erosion of the Administrative Procedure Act, 37
A. B. A. J. 641 (1951).
123. 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U. S. C. § 1009 (e) (Cum. Supp. 1950).
124. Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938).
125. Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record," 64 HAv,
L. REv. 1233 (1951); Universal Camera Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 340 U. S. 474 (1951);
N. L. R. B. v. Pittsburgh S. S. Co., 340 U. S. 498 (1951).
126. See Matter of Stork Restaurant Inc. v. Boland, 282 N. Y. 256, 26 N. E. 2d 247
(1940); Benjamin, Judicial Review of Administrative Adjudication: Some Recent Decisions
of the New York Court of Appeals, 48 CoL. L. REv. 1 (1948); Shientag, The truman
Element in Judicial and in Administrative Procedure, in FiELD CENTENARY ESSAys, 215-25
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before administrative agencies and the judicial review of their deter-
minations should be the subject of future study and consideration. We
have by no means attained what is desirable or even essential in these
matters. Perhaps an Administrative Court of Appeal should be set up.
Why, for example, should the Legislature deprive the courts of power
to deal with arbitrary or unconscionable penalties imposed by adminis-
trative agencies?' 27 No man can possibly familiarize himself with the
rules and regulations of an agency (and their interpretation), affecting
his business. Do not the requirements of fair play and of natural justice
require that, generally speaking a notice of violation or a desist order
be given before a substantial penalty is imposed?' s
Finally, on this point, it should be emphasized that the personality of
the administrative head plays a much greater part than does the per-
sonality of the judge in arriving at a conclusion, for the former has not
had ingrained in him the judicial respect for fairness and above all of
objectivity. The process of judging, to be sure, is not confined to courts,
but whoever does the judging is subject to the fundamental requirements
of natural justice.
As Mr. Justice Hughes said in an address to the American Law
Institute:
"The controversies within the range of administrative action may be different and
extrem~ely important, and they may call for a particular type of experience and
special methods of inquiry, but the spirit which should animate that action, if the
administrative authority is to be properly exercised, must be the spirit of the just
judge."
Writing not only as a judge, but as one who was the head of an im-
portant state administrative agency, I maintain that the fundamental
doctrine of Anglo-American law-of the supremacy of the law-admits
of no exception, not even for administrative agencies.
Preventive Law
Much is being said today about preventive law. In a measure most
law is designed to be preventive in character-preventive in the sense
(1949); cf. Matter of 54 Cafe & Restaurant v. O'Connell, et al., 274 App. Div. 428, 84
N. Y. S. 2d 729 (1st Dep't), affd, 298 N. Y. 883, 84 N. E. 2d 802 (1948); Matter of
Gonzalez v. O'Connell, 278 App..Div. 463, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 803 (Ist Dep't), aff'd, 303
N. Y. 632, 101 N. E. 2d 705 (1951).
127. Matter of Sagos v. O'Connell, et at., 276 App. Div. 157, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 104 (1st
Dep't 1949), rev'd, 301 N. Y. 212, 93 N. E. 2d 644 (1950).
128. Cf. Matter of Katz's Delicatessen v. O'Connell, et al., 277 App. Div. 363, 100
N. Y. S. 2d 385 (Ist Dep't 1950), rev'd, 302 N. Y. 286, 97 N. E. 2d 905 (1951).
129. N. Y. Times, May 13, 1938, p. 8, col. 1. See Hxx-nr., CuaXs Ev%$s HuGnas
AND = Supara Coumr 113 (1951).
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that it serves notice of what society requires of the individual in his
various relationships with others and with the government. It is a field
which will be more fully explored in the future for it has great possi-
bilities. I can deal with it only rather sketchily.
Preventive law may be stimulated in a number of ways. The first
is by edcation-to endeavor to make the basic principles of law under-
stood by laymen so that primarily they may either avoid trouble or
know enough to obtain legal advice before they actually get into trouble.
This may be done, for example, by elementary instruction in law in the
high schools and colleges, and by lectures, under the auspices of the
bar associations, on law for laymen as the medical societies do in their
field. In the second place the bar associations may help by encouraging
and enabling a person to obtain preventive legal advice on terms he can
afford. The Lawyers Referral Service is doing excellent work along
these lines. The Legal Aid Society, in extending help to those who are
unable to pay at all, is discharging an important function.
In the third place there are specific preventive provisions in the law
itself, such as the remedy of declaratory judgment, the use of the injunc-
tion, the requirements for licenses of various kinds, the requirements of
the Securities and Exchange Commission before the issuance of securi-
ties, and the rules of the Federal Trade Commission.
The courts themselves can do much more than they are now doing
in this field. We have pre-trial calendars in the civil courts, and much
work of a preventive nature is done in the Domestic Relations Court,
the Home Term branch of the Magistrate's Court, under the Youthful
Offenders Procedure and by means of the probation and parole system
generally. There should be something in the nature of pre-trial confer-
ence in matrimonial cases in the Supreme Court; the custody of children
should be dealt with not as a legal problem but as one of the most sensi-
tive problems in human relations. Because man is created in the image
of God he can never be reduced to the level of a thing or chattel. A child
is not a commodity or an article of commerce. It requires no amend-
ment to the law to authorize social investigations or psychiatric exami-
nations in custody cases in the Supreme Court. The power is there;
the facilities are lacking, unless the parties have enough funds to pay for
the necessary studies. The Supreme Court, if it is to retain jurisdiction
in matrimonial cases and I believe it should, ought to be given such
facilities. Until that is done the court is always- free to call on other
governmental agencies and social welfare organizations for assistance
and I have never found lack of cooperation from those quarters.
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Forces Contributing to the Progressive Development of the Law
Among the agencies which are contributing much to the steady, scien-
tific development of the law and enabling it to meet social and economic
needs are the university law schools, with their increasing emphasis on
the social implications of the law and its kinship with the other sciences,
physical and social. The mighty river of the law must be fed by many
tributary streams. There is the work of the legal scholars, the students
of jurisprudence whose research, textbooks, and articles in legal period-
icals, have made a marked beneficial impact on the law. As Justice
Hughes pointed out, no judge will finish work on an important or novel
question of law without consulting the pertinent articles andnotes in
the law reviews, some of which have made legal history."a
The last few decades have witnessed the growth of legal research and
to some extent, although not nearly what it should be, of clinical research
and surveys in the law-that is, the study of the law and its procedure
in action; new techniques to accomplish this will have to be developed.
The educational foundations in this country have commenced to take an
interest in legal research and to manifest, by increasingly substantial
contributions, an appreciation of its value and importance. The estab-
lishment of law centers and of institutes of comparative law will do much
for the healthy expansion and growth of our law.1 3 ' Mention should
also be made of the accomplishments of the American Law Institute in
the Restatement of the Law, of the work of the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws,' 32 the creation of Legislative Bill Drafting Bureaus,
130. ". . . there has been a growing regard for these 'notes,' as helpful analyses of
decisions, while the articles contributed to the reviews by eminent legal experts have
given lawyers and judges the benefit of wide research and exploration, not infrequently
blazing new trails in preference to old but less desirable paths. It is not too much to say
that, in confronting any serious problem, a wide-awake and careful judge will at once
look to see if the subject has been discussed, or the authorities collated and analyzed, in
a good law periodical." Charles Evans Hughes in the Foreword to 50 Yarx L. J. 737
(1941). "Where shall we turn for the statement of the law, for the patient research of
the specialist, for the condensation of material, the philosophical analysis, the detection
of departures and trends? With rare exceptions, we must look to the faculties of our law
schools, to the little groups of experts, each having a definite field. I am far from sug-
gesting the infallibility of law professors. Their feet, I think both judges and practicing
lawyers sometimes feel, are not always on the earth and their voices are not a harmonious
chorus. If we formed a high court from among the best of them they would equally need
their critics, and doubtless we should read with unregenerate glee the dissenting opinions
which would then flourish in a new freedom." CHAmREs EvA.,s HuGHEs, ADD.ESS TO
HARvARD LAw SCH OOL ALVTSmI Assoc.ATiox 30 (June 21, 1920).
131. "The time has gone by when it was fashionable to treat foreign systems as Mr.
Pecksniff stigmatized sirens,-'fabulous animals (pagan, I regret to say)."' Winfield, Thi
Law al Tort, 51 L. Q. Rav. 249, 262 (1935).
132. Mention should be made, for example, of the Uniform Commercial Code the final
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the educational activities of the various Bar Associations and the excel-
lent pioneer work of the Practising Law Institute in the field of Post-
Admission Legal Education.
Finally, and perhaps most important, is the step taken in this state
in 1934 by the creation of the Law Revision Commission and of the
Judicial Council. The Judicial Council has succeeded in securing many
helpful changes in practice and procedure. The work of the Law Revi.
sion Commission has been especially valuable. Despite its meager appro-
priation, which should be substantially increased, its recommendations,
supported by thorough, expert research studies, have brought about im-
portant reforms in the law, too numerous even for mention here.18 In
the neighborhood of one hundred and fifty laws of varying degrees of
importance have been enacted as the result of its recommendations.
These two permanent state agencies set up to make a continuing, expert
study of the law and its procedure have fully justified their existence.
They have counteracted the tendency to lethargy and lack of initiative;
they have served as a corrective to ill-informed and misdirected attempts
at reform. One weakness perhaps is that, unlike other departments of
the state government, they are not in a position to fight for the adoption
of their recommendations. They present them to the Legislature and
make out the best case they can for them. They have however, with
the cooperation of committees of the various bar associations, been on
the whole quite successful; we look to increased effort on the part of
those committees in the future. All of these forces, working together,
will do much to mould the law of the future along the proper lines and
make it a living organism, senstive to the ideals, the aspirations and the
social values of the times.
Conclusion
The pulse of life beats strongly in the law. The stream of progress
has, for the most part, continued to flow steadily. A deep-rooted sense
of tradition has been successfully combined with a flexibility and a
capacity for growyth that have enabled the law to absorb fresh ideas into
its bloodstream.
Justice in the courts, administered without favor by men and women
conspicuous for patience, probity, ability and independence--that is
draft of which was approved by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the Amerl.
can Law Institute on September 15, 1951. This Code, it is expected, will be introduced in
a number of state legislatures (including New York) early in 1952.
133. See Shientag, A Ministry of Justice in Action, The Work o'/ the New York State
Law Revision Commission, 22 ComELL L. Q. 183 (1937); MacDonald, The New York
State Law Revision Commission, McKxrNzy's SEssioN LAws OF NEw YoiuX No. 6, XXXIX
(1949); The New York State Law Revision Commission: A Legislative Aid, 35 A. B. A. J.
512 (1949).
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the best assurance of respect for and confidence in our free democratic
institutions. Primarily it is the obligation of the Bar to educate public
opinion concerning the problems confronting the law and its adminis-
tration.
It is a satisfaction to look back on the long history of the law and
to find in it, in such a marked degree, both stability and moral fulfill-
ment. But as Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out: "Gratifying as is the
record of achievement, it would be extreme folly to engage in mere lauda-
tion or to surrender to the enticing delusion of a thoughtless optimism."
De Tocqueville said, "I should have loved freedom, I believe, at all
times, but in the times in which we live, I am ready to worship it." What
shall we say and do to maintain that freedom in our democracy, in these
days of tension, insecurity and peril!
The test of any good system of human law is not finality; it is
progress. A disposition to preserve, a determination and an ability to
improve, taken together, will make for continued progress in the law
along the lines of natural justice and of social and economic needs. Yes,
the stream of progress in the law continues to flow steadily. It is for you
my brethren of the Bar to keep that stream fresh and clear and undefiled.
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